Judicial Review: Historical overview and implications of Marbury v. Madison

Introduction 

The Supreme Court of the United States derives its authority through its ability to interpret the law and determine its constitutionality. This foundational doctrine was recognized with the establishment of the landmark Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison, in 1803. Marbury v. Madison famously established the doctrine of judicial review and solidified the checks and balances on the executive and legislative branches from the authority of the courts. The impact of the case is significant as it solidified the balance of power between the branches of government and successfully established the Constitution as the supreme law of the land in the United States of America. 

Historical Context: The Appointment of the ‘Midnight Judges’ and the Legal Right to a Commission 

In order to understand the establishment of judicial review, one has to understand the historical context that surrounds the landmark court case. It begins when John Adams, the second president of the United States, loses the election of 1800 to then vice president, Thomas Jefferson. The election of 1800 was the first politically competitive presidential election in the history of the United States where incumbent John Adams, belonging to the Federalist party, ran against his Vice President, Thomas Jefferson, who belonged to the Democratic-Republican party. The electoral system of the early republic required each member of the electoral college to cast one vote for the president and one vote for the vice president. This system allowed for the contestant with the highest votes to attain the office of the presidency while the runner-up assumed the office of the vice presidency. Hence, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr ran as the two candidates representing the Democratic-Republicans and John Adams and Charles Pinckney representing the Federalists. As a result of the electoral system, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr tied with the highest number of electoral votes of 73 each. Hence, the election went to the House of Representatives, where ten state delegations voted for Thomas Jefferson and four state delegations voted for Aaron Burr. Therefore, Thomas Jefferson was the third official president of the United States, and Aaron Burr assumed the office of Vice President. Towards the end of Adams’ presidency, the Judiciary Act of 1801 was passed, and it attempted to restructure the federal judiciary. Some of the provisions of the act included the reduction of the Supreme Court’s caseload through the creation of new judicial circuits and the creation of new judgeships. As a result, John Adams appointed twenty-three justices of the peace in Washington County on March 2, 1801. The next day, John Adams signed the commissions and the then Secretary of State, John Marshall, affixed the seal of the United States and sent out the commissions to be delivered to the newly appointed judges. However, none of the twenty three newly appointed judges in Washington county received their commissions before the end of Adams’ presidency on March 4, 1801. These appointments famously came to be known as the ‘midnight judges’ as John Adams appointed these judges just two days before the end of his term to establish a federalist foothold in the federal judiciary. However, as Thomas Jefferson assumed power, he instructed his Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold the commissions as he believed these ‘midnight judges’ undermined the values of the Democratic-Republican party. However, one of these judicial appointments was made to William Marbury, who sued James Madison and brought the case to the Supreme Court of the United States to issue a writ of mandamus to induce James Madison to deliver his commission to be a justice of the peace in Washington County. 

Marbury v. Madison: The establishment of judicial review and its implications

The court case was argued on February 11, 1803, and subsequently decided on February 24, 1803. The advocates in this case were Charles Lee, representing William Marbury. On the other side, Levi Lincoln Sr. represented James Madison. The holding was a unanimous 4-0 for Madison as Chief Justice John Marshall, Associate Justice William Paterson, Associate Justice Samuel Chase, and Associate Justice Bushrod Washington voted in the majority and argued that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was illegal but established that the court could not issue a writ of mandamus due to the conflicting interpretations of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitution of the United States. In particular, the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established a right to bring one’s claim with the writ of mandamus was unconstitutional as it expanded the court’s power of original jurisdiction under Article III, Section II of the Constitution. Additionally, Associate Justice William Cushing and Associate Justice Alfred Moore were not present for oral arguments due to illness. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the court and established the foundational doctrine of judicial review that serves as a nexus point for ensuring the judicial check on the executive and legislative branches of the United States of America. Chief Justice Marshall authored the majority opinion and began by posing three distinct questions that were central to deciding the case.

1: Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?

2: If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?

3: If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court? 

First, regarding the issue of whether Marbury had a right to the commission, Marshall argues that Marbury is entitled to the commission because he has legally been nominated to the position. To justify this principle, he argues that Article II, Section II, of the Constitution allows the President of the United States to nominate “ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls” with the advice and consent of the Senate. Through this power, Marshall establishes that “the commission and the appointment seem inseparable, it being almost impossible to show an appointment otherwise than by proving the existence of a commission; still, the commission is not necessarily the appointment; though conclusive evidence of it.” Marshall also argues that the signature of President Adams on the commission showcases that he acted upon the advice of the Senate and signed onto the nomination. Hence, reaching the conclusion that the inherent process of appointing, signing, and the commission’s seal all affirm Marbury’s ability to demand the right to the commission in which he is entitled to receive. After more deliberate analysis, Marshall concludes that Madison’s decision to withhold the commission “is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.” Therefore, granting the applicant the right to the commission he demands and affirming the first question. 

Secondarily, after it has been recognized that Marbury has the right to the commission, even though it was not delivered to him, Marshall approaches the sequitur regarding the question on whether the laws of the country afford Marbury a remedy for the violation upon his right of not receiving his commission. To address this question, Marshall summarizes that the laws of this country afford an individual the right to a remedy upon the injury of his rights. He proclaims that  “a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.” Hence, establishing the argument that the Marbury not only has a right to the commission but also retains the right to seek remedy for the violation of that right in the form of a legal proceeding.

Lastly, reaching the crux of the court case, Marshall goes into further detail about the role of the Supreme Court and the authority it retains in order to come to the conclusion of whether the Supreme Court has the right to issue the writ of mandamus to induce Madison to deliver the commission upon which Marbury is entitled. To this end, Marshall examines the relationship between the Supreme Court and the writ of mandamus. Marshall argues that Section XIII of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizes the Supreme Court to “issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.” Hence, it might seem reasonable that Marbury has grounds for requesting a writ of mandamus regarding his legal right to the commission. However, Marshall argues that the provision comes in direct conflict with Article III, Section II, Clause II of the Constitution, which proclaims that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” Logically speaking, Marshall comes to the conclusion that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 upon which Marbury bases his claim on for a writ of mandamus is unconstitutional as it expands the judicial authority of the court beyond the scope of Article III when it comes to the issue of original jurisdiction. Hence, he argues that “to enable the Court to issue a mandamus to compel the delivery of the commission of a public office by the Secretary of State, it must be shown that it is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or that it be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.” However, the act of issuing the writ of mandamus under Marbury’s request would fall under the court’s original jurisdiction, not under appellate jurisdiction, which directly conflicts Article III’s restriction of the Supreme Court to hear cases pertinent to original jurisdiction only under matters affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls. Marshall eloquently puts this as “although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.” Hence, concluding that the court cannot fulfill the request of Mabury in granting a writ of mandamus to acquire his commission, which he is entitled to due to his request expanding the role of the Supreme Court to act outside of its restricted bounds by the Constitution. Marshall argued that granting the writ of mandamus would cause the court to address this case as a matter that falls within original jurisdiction when original jurisdiction cases only apply to ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls. Hence, it is not the court’s right to grant Marbury the writ of mandamus. 

After deciding the case and arguing that the court cannot grant the writ of mandamus to Marbury, Marshall firmly establishes the doctrine of judicial review in an attempt to resolve the contradiction between the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Article III, Section II, and Clause II of the Constitution. Marshall states that the “constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.” After establishing the supremacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, Marshall clarifies the role of the Supreme Court and the arbiter of the law and strengthens the principle of judicial review.

“It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each.”

Hence, the establishment of a law that is opposed to the Constitution ought to be deemed unconstitutional, and it is the role of the Supreme Court to declare it void under its role under the newly strengthened principle of judicial review, which paved the way for the Supreme Court’s role in the United States for years to come. 

Conclusion

The doctrine of judicial review is crucial and pivotal to the functionality of the court system in the United States. It is the foundational principle upon which thousands of cases have been adjudicated, and it effectively maintains the balance of power between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the federal government. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison is critical to understanding the role and authority of the judiciary. While establishing the argument that Marbury has a legal right to the commission and the right to seek remedy because he had been injured by the law of the land, Marshall carefully crafts a decision in which he restricts the court’s ability to grant the writ of mandamus. Since granting the writ of mandamus allows the courts to overstep their bounds within the scope of original jurisdiction. It is important to note that judicial review has also been a prevalent idea before Marbury v. Madison, as in Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argues in favor of an independent judiciary that has the power to interpret the laws and dispels fears about granting lifelong appointments to federal judges. However, Marbury v. Madison provided the first definitive legal precedent within the nation’s history. Additionally, the logic of the decision followed that Section XIII of the Judiciary Act of 1789 directly conflicted with Article III, Section II, Clause II of the Constitution, and Marshall deferral to the Constitution effectively established the Constitution of the United States as the supreme law of the land. In his opinion, Marshall argued that the Constitution was the supreme law of the land, and when there was a matter of conflict, judges ought to defer to the Constitution as the ultimate arbiter of the law. All in all, Marbury v. Madison is a landmark Supreme Court case that has established the principle of judicial review and effectively adjudicated the role of the judiciary as the arbiter of the law in the United States of America.